Ever so slowly the background to and the ramp up to what has become the disastrous Iraqi War see the light of day - and in the process the mindset and "thinking" of George W.
Harper's Magazine, yesterday, had this:
"It’s not as dramatic as the Downing Street Memo but El Pais, the Madrid daily, has obtained a revealing transcript of a pre-Iraq War meeting between President Bush and Spain’s then-prime minister Jose Maria Aznar. Below is the lead to the story, which ran in El Pais today. One caveat: I did the translation and while I’m sure it’s accurate, it may not be elegant.
Four weeks before the invasion of Iraq . . . George W. Bush made a public demand to Saddam Hussein in the following terms: disarmament or war. Behind closed doors, Bush acknowledged that the war was inevitable. During a long private conversation with [Aznar], which took place on Saturday, February 22, 2003, Bush made clear that the time had come to take out Saddam: “There are two weeks left. In two weeks we’ll be militarily ready. We’ll be in Baghdad by the end of March.”
Now, today the "story" is taken one step further, also in Harper's Magazine:
"I agree with Ken Silverstein–the note published yesterday by Spain’s El País of a conversation which occurred between President Bush and then-Prime Minister José Maria Aznar is a major further breakthrough in understanding the attitude of President Bush in the weeks just preceding the invasion of Iraq. The document is not quite as damning at the Downing Street papers, but it does tend to reinforce the major thrust of the British notes on Bush’s pre-invasion rants.
It is to be stressed that, as was the case with the British documents, this note is particularly credible in that it was recorded by a close ally which was publicly committed to supporting, and did support, Bush in his drive against Iraq.
What emerges is a president full of swagger noting how he will use the great resources of the United States to press other nations (specifically here: members of the Security Council) into line in upcoming votes. He is also resolved to proceed with the invasion no matter what the Security Council does, and no matter what Saddam does. He feigns certitude about his conclusions on Saddam’s involvement with WMD programs—though we now know that the intelligence community had come to discount the supposed evidence for Saddam’s pursuit of WMDs at the time. His convictions are delusional, or they are mere pretense."