It is hard not to forget the amazing scenes, early last year, of multitudes of people in Tahrir Square, Cairo, as part of the so-called Arab Spring. Now, an election looms.
Yasser M. el-Shimy is a Middle East analyst at the International Crisis Group and has an op-ed piece in The New York Times on the election:
Questions remain as to who should draft a new constitution, what authority the new head of state might have, particularly in relation to the legislative branch, and what role the military might play in the burgeoning political system. With candidates from the revolutionary movement, Islamists and members of the old guard vying for leadership, the election could be one final opportunity for Egypt’s de facto ruler, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, to help usher in a genuine and safe political transition.
The SCAF, a 20-member body of Egypt’s top military brass once headed by Hosni Mubarak, was initially hailed as a defender of the uprising, but its high-handed management of the transition and seemingly paradoxical decisions have eroded some of the goodwill it enjoyed in February of last year.
It finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place. Historically, the SCAF has considered itself to be the only national actor with the legitimacy, ability and wisdom to protect the country from threats both foreign and domestic. But now it is being forced to respond to mounting demands for radical political changes from a mobilized protest movement and to the political rise of the long-persecuted Islamists.
These developments go against its conservative nature and deep attachment to stability and continuity. In a way, the military has been in charge of administering the very process that is chipping away at its nearly seven decades of political and economic prerogatives.
To be sure, the generals are not keen on governing, but with insecurity high, volatility in the Sinai and troubles in neighboring Gaza, Libya and Sudan, they are reluctant right now to trust an untested civilian leadership. Nor do they accept attempts to undermine their privileged status, which includes a budget largely outside of civilian control, virtual immunity from prosecution and important business ventures linked to key parts of the economy.
On top of that, despite being extremely shy of the public spotlight, the military does not want its influence to diminish, as demanded by the secular-minded protest movement or to see the balance of power shift to a single political party, especially an Islamist one."
Yasser M. el-Shimy is a Middle East analyst at the International Crisis Group and has an op-ed piece in The New York Times on the election:
"Egypt’s presidential election this week is shaping up as a high-stakes, winner-takes-all contest for power in the absence of clearly defined rules.
Questions remain as to who should draft a new constitution, what authority the new head of state might have, particularly in relation to the legislative branch, and what role the military might play in the burgeoning political system. With candidates from the revolutionary movement, Islamists and members of the old guard vying for leadership, the election could be one final opportunity for Egypt’s de facto ruler, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, to help usher in a genuine and safe political transition.
The SCAF, a 20-member body of Egypt’s top military brass once headed by Hosni Mubarak, was initially hailed as a defender of the uprising, but its high-handed management of the transition and seemingly paradoxical decisions have eroded some of the goodwill it enjoyed in February of last year.
It finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place. Historically, the SCAF has considered itself to be the only national actor with the legitimacy, ability and wisdom to protect the country from threats both foreign and domestic. But now it is being forced to respond to mounting demands for radical political changes from a mobilized protest movement and to the political rise of the long-persecuted Islamists.
These developments go against its conservative nature and deep attachment to stability and continuity. In a way, the military has been in charge of administering the very process that is chipping away at its nearly seven decades of political and economic prerogatives.
To be sure, the generals are not keen on governing, but with insecurity high, volatility in the Sinai and troubles in neighboring Gaza, Libya and Sudan, they are reluctant right now to trust an untested civilian leadership. Nor do they accept attempts to undermine their privileged status, which includes a budget largely outside of civilian control, virtual immunity from prosecution and important business ventures linked to key parts of the economy.
On top of that, despite being extremely shy of the public spotlight, the military does not want its influence to diminish, as demanded by the secular-minded protest movement or to see the balance of power shift to a single political party, especially an Islamist one."
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